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Abstract: This paper examines how the presence of a non-negligible fraction of reciprocally
fair actors changes the provision of incentives through contracts. We provide experimental
evidence that principals have a strong preference for less complete contracts although the
standard self-interest model predicts that they should prefer the more complete contract. Our
theoretical analysis shows that fairness concerns can explain this preference for less
completeness. Fair principals keep their promises which provides strong pecuniary incentives
through an incomplete contract. Selfish principals free-ride and exploit the agents. Counter-
intuitively, selfish agents are induced to work by an incomplete contract while fair agents
shirk.
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21. Introduction
We examine how the presence of fairness and equity motives changes and complicates the
provision of incentives. Incentives are the essence of economics. A substantial amount of
evidence has been accumulated during the last 15 years indicating that fairness considerations
affect the behaviour of many people. For example, there is by now a lot of evidence
suggesting that firms’ wage setting is constrained by workers’ views about what constitutes a
fair wage and by workers’ reciprocal responses to the wage offered.1 There is also evidence
that fairness concerns are relevant for contractual design.2 A main feature of fair behaviour in
many situations is, that in response to an act of A that is favourable to B, B is willing to take
costly actions to return at least part of the favour, and in response to an act that is perceived as
harmful by B, B is willing to take costly actions to reduce A’s material payoff. Note that B’s
reciprocal action occurs even if B derives no material benefit from it. Fairness, as we use the
term in this paper, is thus not a form of altruism, i.e. of unconditional kindness, but a
reciprocal response that occurs even in the absence of any material benefits.
In this paper we argue that reciprocally fair behaviour may render explicit contracts
inferior relative to implicit contracts although – under the standard self-interest assumption –
the explicit contract is predicted to be better in terms of efficiency and in terms of the
principal’s expected material payoff. Our argument relies on strong experimental evidence
and on a theoretical analysis that is based on the model of inequity aversion by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999).3 The experiment under consideration is part of a sequence of experiments on
incomplete contracts that are described and analysed in more detail in Fehr, Klein and
Schmidt (1999) and Schmidt, Kremhelmer and Fehr (1999). In the experiment principals had
the choice between an explicit contract and an implicit contract. In the explicit contract
principals explicitly conditioned a fine on the agent’s deviation from a desired effort level. In
the implicit contract they could not do this. Instead they could promise to pay a bonus after
they have observed the agent’s effort. The promise was, however, not binding and merely
cheap talk. The possibility to credibly condition the fine on the actual effort level renders the
explicit contract more complete than the implicit contract.
                                                
1 See, e.g. Bewley (1995) or Agell and Lundberg (1995).
2 For example, Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) have shown that reciprocal fairness causes a large increase
in the set of enforceable contracts and, hence, large efficiency gains relative to the predictions of the standard
approach that assumes that everybody is completely selfish.
3 Recently several model of equity and reciprocity have been developed. For other generally applicable
approaches see, e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels (forthcoming), Falk and Fischbacher (1998) or Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (1998). For a combination of stochastic game theory with our theory of inequity aversion see
Goeree and Holt (1999).
3In contrast to the standard prediction the implicit contract was chosen in the vast
majority (88 percent) of all cases and agents’ effort levels were much higher under this
contract. The data pattern together with our theoretical analysis suggests that the presence of
fair types and the peculiarities of their interaction with the selfish types was crucial for this
outcome. First of all, and most importantly, the presence of fair principals implies that the
promised bonus does not merely represent cheap talk because fair principals can and do in
fact condition the bonus payment on the effort level. Their capability to actually commit to
paying a conditional bonus is based on their fairness preferences. Conditional bonus
payments, in turn, provide a strong pecuniary incentive for the agents to perform as desired by
the principals. Interestingly, however, our analysis suggests that the fair-minded agents do not
provide the desired effort level but they shirk because they are afraid of being cheated by the
selfish principals. Thus, the presence of fair principals induces selfish agents to perform while
the presence of selfish principals induces the fair agents to shirk under the implicit contract.
The overall result of this interaction between the types is that an appropriately chosen implicit
contract elicits, on average, higher effort levels than the explicit contract and is, hence, more
profitable for fair principals. This implies that the same implicit contract is even more
profitable for the selfish principals because they never pay the bonus but receive, on average,
the same effort from the agents. This is so because the selfish principals mimic the offers of
the fair principals and, therefore, agents do not know the principal’s type. As a consequence,
both selfish and fair principals have a preference for the implicit contract.
2. The experiment
The structure of the game that was played in the experiments is as follows. There is a
principal who can hire one agent whom he wants to spend effort, e, in her firm. The
production function is linear in effort and given by a×e, a>0. Effort is costly to the agent and
the effort cost function c(e) is strictly increasing and convex in e.
At stage 1, the principal has to decide what kind of contract to offer to the agent. She
can choose between an „implicit“ and an „explicit“ contract. An implicit contract specifies a
fixed wage, w,  and a desired effort level e*, with w³c(e*). In addition, the principal can
announce a bonus, b*, that may be paid after actual effort e has been observed. There is no
contractual obligation to pay the announced bonus, nor is the agent obliged to choose e*. An
explicit contract also specifies a fixed wage, w,  and a desired effort level e*, with w³c(e*).
4Here, however, the principal can impose a fine, f, on the agent that has to be paid to the
principal with probability 1/3 if the actual effort level of the agent falls short of e*. The fine is
bounded above by some exogenously given maximum level f’. If the principal chooses the
explicit contract, she has to incur a small fixed cost, k.
At stage 2, the agent observes what contract has been offered and decides whether to
accept or reject the offer. If he rejects, the game ends and both parties get a payoff of 0. If he
accepts, he has to choose his actual effort level, e.
At stage 3 the principal observes the actual effort level. If she has offered an implicit
contract, she now has to decide on the actual bonus payment, b, to the agent. If she has
offered an explicit contract and if the agent’s effort falls short of e*, a random draw decides
with probability 1/3 whether the agent is fined. Finally, payoffs are made.
If all players have purely selfish preferences, the analysis of this game is
straightforward. A selfish principal would never pay a bonus, so b=0. Anticipating this, there
is no incentive for the agent to spend more than the minimum effort, e. Hence, if the principal
chooses the implicit contract, she should offer w=c(e). This gives her a payoff UP=ae-c(e)
while the agent gets a payoff of 0. If the principal chooses the explicit contract, she should
clearly go for the maximum fine f’. Let e’ denote the maximum effort level such that the agent
prefers to choose e’ rather than to choose e=e and to pay the fine f’ with probability 1/3, and
assume that e’ is smaller that the efficient effort level, eFB. Then the optimal explicit contract
has w=c(e’), e*=e’, and f=f’ which gives a payoff UP = ae’-c(e’) - k to the principal and a
payoff of 0 to the agent. If e’>e and k is not too large, the explicit contract is optimal.
We ran this experiment in two sessions with 46 subjects over 10 periods. A session
lasted approximately 2.5 hours and, on average, a subject earned 65 German Marks (DM).
The subjects were undergraduate students of law at the University of Munich. In each period
(consisting of the three stages described above) each agent was matched to a different
principal and this was known by all subjects. We chose parameters to be a=10, eÎ{1, ..., 10},
k=10 and f’=13. The agent’s cost function is such that c(1)=0, c(10)=20 and 1£ c’(e) £4.4
Hence, the efficient effort level is eFB=10. The maximum fine was chosen such that e’=4. If
all players have purely selfish preferences, then the subgame perfect equilibrium payoff to the
                                                
4 The exact cost function was given by
e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 20
5principal if she chooses the optimal implicit contract is UP=10 while she would get UP=10 e’
- c(e’) - k = 40 - 4 - 10 = 26 if she chooses the optimal explicit contract. Hence, the self-
interest-model predicts that all principals should opt for the explicit contract because much
higher effort levels are predicted for this contract.
The experimental evidence is completely at odds with this prediction. Out of the 230
observations the explicit contract was chosen only 28 times with the fraction of explicit
contracts declining over time. The fraction of explicit contracts declined from 13 percent in
period one to 4 percent in period ten. In view of the relative profitability of explicit contracts
this is not surprising because those who chose the explicit contract made an average loss of 9
tokens (1 token = 0.2 DM » 0.12 $US) while those who chose the implicit contract made an
average profit of 26 tokens. The average income of the agents was roughly the same for both
contracts (18 tokens). The time paths of average wages, bonuses, effort levels and fines are
depicted in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here
Implicit contracts stipulate, on average, wages around 15 and the desired effort level is
6.6 while the actual effort level is 5.2. On average, the announced bonus is 25 and the actual
bonus payment is 10.5 tokens. In view of the small number of observations for explicit
contracts the data for explicit contracts must be interpreted with some caution. The average
fine rose from 10 to the maximum fine f'=13 over time. If the principals required the agents to
choose effort levels that are enforceable with f’=13 (i.e. e*£4), five out of six agents
complied. However, it seems that many principals tried to induce a higher effort level by
paying a more generous base wage and by requiring an effort e*>4. Most of these attempts
failed (in 18 out of 22 cases) and caused significant losses for the principals. On average the
desired effort level under the explicit contract is 5.6 while the actual average effort is only 2.1.
Among other things, Figure 1 exhibits two important results that are likely to drive
contractual choices and that unambiguously refute the standard prediction with selfish
individuals: (i) The average effort under the implicit contract is much higher than under the
explicit contract. (ii) The average bonus payment is always positive. Moreover, as Table 1
indicates, there is a strong positive correlation between the actual effort and the average bonus
payment.
Insert Table 1 here
                                                                                                                                                        
6These facts suggest the following intuitive explanation of contractual choices. Since
higher effort levels are associated with significantly higher bonus payments, agents had a
monetary incentive to put forward a relatively high effort level in the implicit contract. This,
in turn, increased the relative profitability of this contract considerably and induced principals
to prefer this contract. Note, that the average effort under the implicit contract is considerably
above the effort that is enforceable in the explicit contract with selfish agents.5
In the following we provide a theoretical underpinning for the above intuitive
explanation in terms of our model of inequity aversion. In Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we have
shown that this model can organise a large amount of seemingly contradictory and puzzling
data. We would like to stress that the above experiment has not been designed to test our
theory nor do we believe that the experiment can be used to discriminate between different
theories of fairness or reciprocity. Nonetheless, in view of the model’s explanatory power in
many other games, it is interesting to know what this model predicts for the above contract
experiment, whether it can organise the major behavioural patterns in this experiment and
whether the explanation provides new and interesting insights into the mechanisms that
determine principals’ contractual choices and agents’ behavioural responses in the presence of
fairness concerns.
3. A simple model of inequity aversion
In this section we briefly describe the model of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
A basic assumption of our model is that there is a non-negligible fraction of inequity averse
players. An individual is inequity averse if it dislikes outcomes that are perceived as
inequitable or unfair. This assumption is based on strong empirical evidence that indicates
that not only absolute but also relative payoffs have a strong impact on some people’s well
being and behaviour (see e.g. Loewenstein et al. 1989, Clark and Oswald 1996). This
definition raises, of course, the difficult question how individuals measure or perceive the
fairness of outcomes. The determination of the relevant reference group and the relevant
reference payoff may be affected by the social context, the saliency of particular individuals,
the social proximity among individuals and several other factors and is ultimately an
empirical question. If, however, we restrict attention to individual behaviour in economic
                                                
5 One also might conjecture that the preference for implicit contracts is caused by the fact that the explicit
contract involves a punishment while the implicit contract involves a reward. However, we could rule out this
7experiments,  then it is natural to assume that the reference group is simply the set of subjects
playing against each other and that the reference point, i.e. the equitable outcome, is given by
the egalitarian outcome.6
More precisely, we assume that inequity averse players experience a utility loss if they
are worse off in material terms than the other players in the experiment and they also dislike
to be better off. In our context it suffices to consider the two-player case.7 Let x=(x1,x2) denote
the vector of monetary payoffs. The utility function of player i Î {1,2} is given by
 (1) Ui(x) = xi - ai max {xj - xi,0} - bi max {xi - xj,0},  i ¹ j.  
where we assume bi £ ai and 0 £ bi < 1. The second term in (1) measures the utility loss from
disadvantageous inequality, while the third term measures the loss from advantageous
inequality.
To evaluate the implications of this utility function note that we assume that the utility
function is linear in inequality as well as in xi. This implies that the marginal rate of
substitution between monetary income and inequality is constant. This may not be completely
realistic, but surprisingly many experimental observations that seem to contradict each other
can be explained on the basis of  this very simple utility function already.
Furthermore, we assume ai ³ bi, i.e., a player suffers more from inequality that is to
his disadvantage. We also assume that bi < 1. To interpret this restriction suppose that player i
has a higher monetary payoff than player j. In this case bi = 0.5 implies that player i is just
indifferent between keeping 1 Dollar to himself and giving this Dollar to player j. If bi = 1,
then player i is prepared to throw away 1 Dollar in order to reduce his advantage relative to
player j which seems very implausible. This is why we do not consider the case bi ³ 1. On the
other hand, there is no justification to put an upper bound on ai. To see this suppose that
player i has a lower monetary payoff than player j. In this case player i is prepared to give up
one Dollar of his own monetary payoff if this reduces the payoff of his opponent by (1+ai)/ai
Dollars. For example, if  ai = 2, then  player i is willing to give up one Dollar if this reduces
the payoff of his opponent by 1.5 Dollars.
                                                                                                                                                        
explanation through a control experiment.
6 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for a more extensive discussion of  the points raised in this paragraph.
7 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for the formal description of the  n-player case.
84. Fairness and incomplete contracts
In the following we analyse our experimental game by using the theory of inequity aversion.
To simplify the calculations we assume that there are only two types of players. 40 % of the
population is inequity averse with parameters ai,bi > 0.5. 60 % of the population is
completely selfish with ai = bi = 0. This distribution is roughly consistent with the evidence
on other games.8 Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First we show that there exists a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in which selfish principals mimic the contract offers of the inequity
averse principals by proposing the same implicit contract. As we will see, the details of this
contract are quite similar to what we observe in the experiment. Next we show, that, in
equilibrium, the inequity averse principals cannot signal their type by proposing implicit
contracts that differ from the contracts of the selfish types. Although we cannot, of course,
prove, that subjects actually played the equilibrium described below, we believe that our
propositions provide, first, a reasonable description of the evidence and, second, interesting
and potentially important insights about how contractual choices are shaped by the interaction
between selfish and inequity averse types.
Proposition 1: There exists a perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium in this game with the
following equilibrium path properties. Both, the selfish and the inequity averse principal will
choose a payoff-equalising implicit contract (w,e*,b*) with w=10, e*=7 and b*=30. The
inequity averse agents do not cooperate and choose e=1. The selfish agents, however, do
cooperate and choose e=7. At stage 3, no bonus is being paid if e=1. If e=7, then the inequity
averse principal pays the announced bonus, while the selfish principal chooses b=0.
Before we prove Proposition 1 in more detail we would like to emphasise that the
equilibrium characterised above is not the only pooling equilibrium. It will be easy to see
from the proof below that perfect Bayesian pooling equilibria with w³10 can be sustained, in
which the bonus payment made by the inequity averse principal is reduced so that b+w=40.
Furthermore, since e* and b* have no direct payoff consequences there are many other
pooling equilibria with the same physical outcome but different announcements of e* and b*.
In all these pooling equilibria the selfish agent chooses e=7 and the inequity averse agent
chooses e=1. In our view, it is worthwhile to stress that these pooling equilibria describe
subjects’ behaviour in the experimental game surprisingly well. Remember that 88 percent of
                                                
8 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for more details. The qualitative results of the analysis remain unchanged for a
more spread out distribution of types, as long as there is a significant fraction of selfish players.
9all offers were implicit contracts and this fraction increased to 96 percent in the 10th period.
Moreover, the average wage was 15 and average promised bonus payments were 25 which
gave, in sum, exactly 40. The desired average effort was 6.6 and actual average effort was 5.2.
According to Proposition 1 we should observe a desired effort of e*=7 and an actual average
effort of 0.4×1 + 0.6×7 = 4.6 since there are 40 percent inequity averse agents and 60 percent
selfish agents. In the experiment we observed average bonus payments of 10.5 and according
to the Proposition 1 we should observe payments of 0.4×30 + 0.6×0 = 12 on average. Note,
however, that pooling equilibria with lower bonus payments exist as well.
The equilibrium in Proposition 1 can be sustained by the following off-equilibrium-
path strategies and beliefs. If the principal does not choose the implicit contract given in the
proposition, then the agent believes that he faces the selfish principal with probability one.
Hence, off the equilibrium path the agent does not expect to get a bonus, so he always chooses
e=1 if he is offered an implicit contract. If he is offered an explicit contract (w,e*,f), then the
selfish agent chooses e=1 if w-1/3f > w - c(e*). Otherwise he chooses e=e*. If w³17, the
inequity averse agent chooses e³4 so as to equalise payoffs, i.e. w-c(e)=10e-w-k.9 If w<17,
the inequity averse agent either rejects the contract or accepts it and chooses e=e*, depending
on whether 0 > w-c(e*)-a[10e*-2w-k+c(e*)].
To see that this is indeed an equilibrium consider first the principal's bonus decision at
date 3. A selfish principal (b=0) will always choose b=0. An inequity averse principal (b >
0.5) prefers to pay a bonus that equalises the monetary payoff of the principal and the
monetary payoff of the agent: 10e-w-b = w+b-c(e), which implies b(e) = [10e+c(e)]/2 - w
and UP=UA=[10e-c(e)]/2. Note that this behaviour of the inequity averse principals means
that actual bonus payments are increasing in effort. In a pooling equilibrium the agent
believes at stage 2 that he faces an inequity averse principal with probability p=0.4. Thus, his
expected payoff as a function of e is given by
UA(e) =  p [10e-c(e)]/2 + (1-p) [w-c(e)-a(10e-w-w+c(e))]
Substituting the parameters of the experiment and differentiating with respect to e yields
dUA/de = 2 - 6a- (0.8+0.6a) c’(e)
If a=0, then dUA/de³0 if and only if c’(e)£2.5. Hence, given the convex cost function a
selfish agent would choose an effort of e=7. If a>0.5, then dUA/de is always negative, so an
inequity averse agent would choose the minimum effort level e=1. It is interesting to note that
                                                
9 There is an integer problem with the choice of e that slightly complicates the analysis. However, it does not
affect the result.
10
it is the selfish player who engages in effort hoping to get a bonus, while the inequity averse
player does not do so because he suffers too much if the bonus is not being paid.10
If the selfish principal sticks to the equilibrium strategy and offers (w=10, e*=7,
b*=30) at stage 1, then her expected payoff is given by
UPs =  0.6 [70-10] + 0.4 [10-10] = 36
Clearly, offering another implicit contract cannot be optimal because agents then believe that
they face a selfish principal for sure. If the principal offers an explicit contract, then one can
show that her optimal explicit offer would be (w=4,e*=4,f'=13) which is accepted by the
selfish agent and rejected by the inequity averse agent and yields an expected payoff of
0.6[40-4-10]=15.6. Hence, this deviation does not pay either.
Finally, consider the inequity averse principal. If she sticks to the equilibrium strategy,
her expected utility is given by
UPi =  0.6 [70-10-30] + 0.4 [10-10-a(10-0)] = 18-4a
Again, deviating to another implicit contract cannot be optimal. If she chooses an explicit
contract, it can be shown that she should offer (w=17,e*=4,f'=13). This offer will be accepted
by both agents, all agents choose e=4, and the payoff to the principal and to the agent are
equalised. This yields a payoff to the principal of 40-17-10=13. Hence, a deviation does not
pay if a<1.25.
In the pooling equilibrium of Proposition 1 the inequity averse principal suffers from
the existence of selfish principals because their presence induces inequity averse agents to
shirk. It would, thus, be in the interest of the inequity averse principal to signal her type so
that all agents believe that she will pay the promised bonus. However, as Proposition 2 shows
this is not possible in equilibrium.
Proposition 2: There is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the inequity averse
principal offers an implicit contract that differs from the contract offered by the selfish type.
To see this, suppose that there is a separating equilibrium in which the inequity averse
principal offers an implicit contract (wi,ei*,bi*) and in which the agent believes that he faces
the inequity averse principal with probability one after observing this offer. Note first that if
wi < 40, then both, the selfish and the inequity averse agent will choose e=10 because they
know that they are going to get the bonus b(e)=[ae-c(e)]/2-w for sure. If wi ³ 40, then an
                                                
10 Note also that if agents were not inequality averse but altruistic, then all agents would choose a high effort
level.
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inequity averse principal will not pay an additional bonus even if e=10. Therefore with wi ³
40 the selfish agent would choose e=1 which implies that the inequity averse principal gets a
negative expected payoff. This cannot happen in equilibrium, so we must have wi < 40.
Consider now the selfish principal. If she is supposed to offer an implicit contract (ws,es*,bs*),
then both agents will choose e=1 because they know that they face the selfish principal.
Therefore, her payoff must be smaller than 10. If she is supposed to offer an explicit contract,
then we know from the proof of Proposition 1 that the optimal contract gives her a payoff of
15.6. However, if she mimics the inequity averse principal and also offers (wi,ei*,bi*), then
both types of the agent would choose e=10 and the selfish principal gets UPs=100-w > 60.
Hence, the selfish principal would always want to mimic the inequity averse principal and a
separating equilibrium cannot exist.
5. Concluding remarks
Examining contractual choices and behavioural responses to different incentives schemes
under the pure self-interest assumption is an important first step. Economic theory has made
enormous progress in this regard during the last two decades. However, in view of the
accumulating evidence that a non-negligible fraction of the population exhibits reciprocally
fair behaviour, it is time to take this into account. Our results indicate that the presence of fair
actors has non-obvious, interesting and important consequences. There is definitely no
scarcity of topics for future theoretical and empirical research in this area.
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Table 1: Average bonus payment conditional on the actual effort level
Effort a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Average bonus b 0 0.17 2.23 5.31 10.08 8.95 13.75 19.04 23.46 28.77
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